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In the years since he formulated and expanded on it in The Anxiety of 
Influence (1973), A Map of Misreading (1975), and Kaballah and Criticism 
(1975), Harold Bloom's theory of the "anxiety of influence" has engendered more 
ambivalence than serious investigation into his theory and its influences. In part, 
the ambivalence is due to Bloom's persona, which irritates the academic "left" 
and "right" alike. Surprisingly, it is not Bloom's defense of canonicity against 
post-structural Marxism, feminism, and New Historical criticism that generates 
the most resistance; instead, Bloom's dissenters more often come from the ranks 
of conservative traditionalists who might be expected to support him. 
The reaction of traditionalist critics to Bloom's work stems from a recognition 
and rejection of how deeply antithetical Bloom's hallmark theory really is in 
relation to the prevailing understanding of literary influence. Taking his cues from 
Deconstruction, the fiercely revisionistic mystical traditions of Gnosticism and 
Kaballah, the philosophy of Nietzsche, and the meditations of Emerson, Bloom's 
theory is revealed—to one's delight or dismay—as profoundly agonistic. 
Nevertheless, a close reading of these influences of Bloom's reveal a profound 
life-affirming humanism that ceaselessly quests for "Gnosis" in all literature. 
v 
Introduction 
Writing in the preface to the second edition (1997) of his seminal The Anxiety of 
Influence (1973), Harold Bloom claims to be "bemused" at the ambivalent response to his 
theories of poetic influence and misreading in the preceding twenty-four years (xi). 
Bloom's puzzlement at this ambivalence is a bit disingenuous or even ironic; his intrepid 
forays into the culture wars1 against "Neo-Marxists, New Feminists, New Historicists, 
French-influenced theorists [who] all demonstrate their cultural materialism by giving us 
a reduced Shakespeare, a pure product of the 'social energies' of the English 
Renaissance" (Anxiety, xv), comprise the bulk of his popular persona, and a certain 
amount of assured hostility to his ideas should be obvious even to him. Arguably, more 
ink has been spilled hectoring his Bardolatry and supposed role as defender of the Dead 
White Male than on his theory of influence, and the ambivalence to his theory owes 
something to his frequent attacks on the "Resenters" who so rankle him. 
However, what is of more interest about the ambivalent reaction to Bloom's theory is 
how often traditionalists, social conservatives, and obviously religious academics take 
issue with him as well. For the chief public defender of the traditional canon—and 
canonicity itself—to have detractors among those who share with him a disdain for 
cultural studies in American universities reveals how lonesome a figure Bloom is in the 
academy, however much his sales figures attest to his popularity outside of it. Writing in 
1
 In September of 2000, Bloom related an incident at Stanford where he dismissed the panel he was on 
stage with, "including one counterculturalist imported from Berkeley to rough me up" saying to those in 
attendance, "You know, I'm getting a little old. We're going to take a five-minute break. And I invite the 
audience to stay behind, but everybody on this platform must go because I've heard only ignorance and 
abusiveness. I—I will not talk to them. I—I will entertain questions from the group" (Interview, par. 41). 
Such arrogance—deserved or not—certainly earns one many enemies. 
1 
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1980, Frank Lentricchia diagnosed Bloom's enduring condition in the culture with 
surprising prescience: 
Bloom's exclusive concentration on the titanic willfulness of strong poets has 
succeeded in reinstating, against every theoretical point he has made, the principle 
of the author—if not in splendid isolation, then in splendidly isolated dialogue 
with his strong ancestors. So despite the fact that he has been received as a radical 
destroyer of traditional methodology, there is a conservative impulse in Bloom's 
theory which succeeds in shoring up the institution of literary studies as we have 
always known it. (343) 
Lentricchia makes the compelling case that Bloom is himself an example of his own 
pernicious theory, and at the heart of his efforts is a problem "most retrograde and anti-
intellectual: the desire, articulated frequently in our advanced critical journals and 
graduate centers of theoretical training, to be an original theorist" (346). In particular, it is 
Bloom's resistance, unwillingness, or inability to reckon with the self-abnegating 
(romantic, metaphysical, or spiritual) aspects of Deconstruction that give Lentricchia 
pause, and which will be taken up in a subsequent section. 
Curiously, if the academic "Left" is unimpressed with influence anxiety because the 
theory takes no part in social justice, the "Right" might be so for a similar reason, a 
reason that stretches back to the foundational arguments set out in The Anxiety of 
Influence, arguments that inform comments like the following from Bloom's How to 
Read and Why: 
The pleasures of reading are indeed selfish rather than social. You cannot directly 
improve anyone else's life by reading better or more deeply. I remain skeptical of 
the traditional social hope that the care for others may be stimulated by the growth 
of the individual imagination, and I am wary of any arguments whatsoever that 
connect the pleasures of solitary reading to the public good. (22) 
Bloom's notion that the praxis of literature, criticism, reading—the humanities—is 
thoroughly amoral is an argument that finds no relief in a close reading of his theory of 
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influence anxiety, which is, if anything, a diagnosis of the poet' s deeply immoral 
psychology. Put another way, Bloom's theory on influence anxiety and his notions of 
how we should read are both richly selfish and self-augmenting: "We experience such 
augmentations as pleasure," Bloom says of reading (and which he would also say of 
writing), "which may be why aesthetic values have always been deprecated by social 
moralists from Plato through our current campus Puritans" (Bloom 2000, 22). For Bloom, 
the moralizing of literature, especially via critical theory, does great violence to its value, 
which is finally deeply personal. 
In any event, the Resenters' argument with Bloom comes down to a tired utilitarian 
one, and whether you pitch your tent with them or with Bloom is foretold by whether or 
not you're delighted at Theophile Gautier's observation that "everything useful is 
ugly.. .The most useful place in a house is the lavatory" (758). But it is the dialectic 
between Bloom and other quarters that suggests a fruitful inquiry. Although Bloom's 
theory is deeply and profoundly Freudian, and his invocation of Gnostic and Kabbalistic 
texts are ostensibly in service to a secular literary idea, recent critical articles argue that 
Bloom's writings, particularly The Book of J, Ruin the Sacred Truths, The American 
Religion, and Agon: Towards a Theory of Revisionism, conflate religion, mysticism, 
theory, prose, and poetry in ways that are presumably dangerous to all of them, and that 
the stakes in Bloom's conception of influence anxiety are indeed religious. It is this 
aspect of Bloom's thought and the critique of Bloom as a perversely sacrilegious figure 
that suggest an anxiety analogous to that of influence, an anxiety that we may think of as 
absence, in the same sense that influence anxiety is a theory of presence. 
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Bloom's argument in The Anxiety of Influence is often couched in temporal terms, 
and as such, the poet's anguish is occasioned by his too late arrival. Although this idea 
has a certain affinity to Oedipal angst, influence anxiety is not ameliorated with any 
Freudian psychoanalytic cure; the poet or "ephebe" cannot be psychoanalyzed out of 
what is a very real condition of belatedness, for the disturbing conjecture at the heart of 
Bloom's theory of influence is that there is nothing left to say. Lateness—properly 
understood as the poet's sense of there being no space left in which to work—is like 
being born with the spirit of Magellan in a world where every inch of the earth is 
mapped, photographed, and catalogued. This problem can be stated as follows: the 
occupation of all artistic space by a predecessor is a condition of overwhelming 
presence. 
Bloom's revisionary ratios—the various tropes his mode of reading uncovers in 
poems, and which evince the poet's resistance to influence—constitute an argument that 
poems are records of poets contending with predecessors, or with the presence of the 
predecessor poet in the psyche of the ephebe. "Every major aesthetic consciousness 
seems peculiarly more gifted at denying obligation as the hungry generations go on 
treading one another down," Bloom says in The Anxiety of Influence (6), highlighting the 
antagonism that influence—or presence—engenders. The creation of artistic real estate, 
so central to the development of a poetic consciousness, is a psychic land war waged 
within the poet and expressed in poems. And this problem requires even stronger and 
more clever defenses as time goes on, for each subsequent poet has that many more 
precursors with whom to deny obligation. Anyone who has tried his hand at fashioning 
something, anything, original should see a measure of truth in Bloom's theory. The 
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repressed anxiety at the heart of every attempt to make art, according to Bloom, is the 
fear that one's work is derivative, profoundly and finally so. 
There is, however, a competing argument against which Bloom's theory of influence 
rails —the dominant Western tradition, actually, despite the incursions and insights of 
post-structural theory—and which believes that Bloom does not properly distinguish the 
derivative from that which is happily influenced by preceding greatness; this argument 
says that artists pay their debt to predecessors in the form of good art, art which 
constitutes the history of an ever-burgeoning aesthetic achievement. In Percy Shelly's A 
Defense of Poetry, the thinking goes thusly: 
A great poem is a fountain for ever overflowing with the waters of wisdom and 
delight; and after one person and one age has exhausted all its divine effluence 
which their peculiar relations enable them to share, another and yet another 
succeeds, and new relations are ever developed, the source of an unforeseen and 
unconceived delight. (710)2 
Although Bloom is a great fan of him, Shelley's formulation is simply too 
teleological, too cheerful for him as a theory of poetry. Poetry is a record of influence, 
not a nifty embellishment or filigree on the great edifice of poetic tradition. But Bloom 
does not therefore argue that the poems of a late poet like Wallace Stevens, for instance, 
are not great accomplishments, just that poems are crises too. Just because a poem is an 
expression of anxiety doesn't make it less a fountain of "wisdom and delight." But 
Bloom believes that the great unreported fact of a poem's origins is found in a deep 
2
 I have found few arguments for poetry's utility more ambivalent that Shelley's "Defense." In arguing that 
Bloom's theory is too Self-centered, Lentricchia notes than Shelley's "Defense" rests on the argument that 
the poet, "possessed by the power of empathy, is wonderfully capable of making his self capacious and 
comprehensive—un-unique and un-particular" (330). In an essay on Plato, Bloom believes that Shelley's 
praise of Plato as a poet is "sly" and in service of esteeming Homer above Plato (Where Shall Wisdom Be 
Found? 65). My own view, again, is that Shelley is ambivalent, torn between irreconcilable fathers, Plato 
and Homer, a position bolstered, I think, by Lentricehia's and Bloom's divergent readings. 
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repression. "A poem begins because there is an absence," Bloom writes in the rich coda 
to his book, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate: 
An image must be given, for a beginning, and so that absence ironically is called a 
presence. Or, a poem begins because there is too strong a presence, which needs to be 
imaged as an absence, if there is to be any imaging at all. So Stevens began 
Domination of Black, suspended between these dialectics and troping for the first 
time against Shelley's fiction of the leaves [...J. (375) 
Bloom goes on to demonstrate where Stevens' poem tropes against Shelley's, but it is the 
notion of the play between presence and absence that goes unremarked by critics of 
Bloom. Perhaps this oversight is because when Bloom talks of absence—often in terms 
akin to Deconstructionist concepts—it is almost always in service of showing influence 
anxiety, or presence. However, absence is not only the masking of presence or the 
clearing of psychic space for artistic creation; inherent in Bloom's conception of 
influence is its inverse, a psychology, aesthetics—perhaps even a religion, finally—of 
absence, which must imagine presence, in the same way that influence or presence 
occasions a need for space or absence. 
Indeed, imagining presence seems to me to be the font of pre-influence literature3— 
the art of Homer and Hesiod, Shakespeare and Dante, Milton and Spencer. If the 
landscape is now filled with presence, the world charted, the psychic/aesthetic space 
filled to the brim with cultural artifacts proving our lateness, it was once empty, and for a 
long time after, sparsely peopled or, if you will, presenced. What then drove us to fill it? 
Bloom's critics who agree with his defense of canonicity, but who are anxious about his 
forays into religion, should be worried and defensive (and they are), for his theory of 
3
 Bloom's is a theory of Romantic poetry, and although his thinking on influence seems to affect his 
reading of pre-Romantic literature, belatedness is an historical condition, so that we might imagine such a 
thing as "pre-influence" literature, which is not to say that there was no influence, but rather, that influence 
was not an anxiety. 
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presence brings with it a profoundly devastating absence-making. His invocations of 
Gnosticism and Kabbalah, his theories of misreading and Nietzschean will, his 
Bardolatry and Emersonian location of the divine and eternal in the Self, are profoundly 
hostile to the dominant or traditional ideas of religion and metaphysics. From Nietzsche, 
Bloom inherited a deep skepticism of Christian mores and a doubt about the ability of 
language to meaningfully appeal to metaphysics at all. From Emerson, Bloom absorbed a 
religion of the Self that bears striking resemblance to Gnostic mystical thought. What 
Bloom's work reveals is a dialectic of presence and absence: his theory of influence, as a 
theory of presence, is also a theory of absence. Influence anxiety is but the opposite of an 
absence anxiety. 
Defending Tradition Against the Anxiety of Absence 
One way in which absence anxiety finds expression is in the insistence that clear 
distinctions between religious, literary, philosophical, and mystical texts be maintained. 
To be sure, the demand that discourses remain identifiable as certain types is to protect us 
from talking past one another and obscurantism, but there is also the need to be met in 
rendering unto Caesar what discursive categories are Caesar's: to mix discourses is to 
sully prayer, the (religious) canon, and scripture. Put bluntly, theorists who attack Bloom 
(from the "Right") are absence-anxious, feeling in Bloom's theory the same violence 
done to sacred texts by Freudian, Feminist, Marxist, Deconstructionist, or any Post-
Structuralist readings that might elide their understanding of the intent of, say, the Bible. 
Bloom's affinity with Post-Structural theory leads to the assumption that Bloom believes 
the distinction between the literary and the religious, the secular and the sacred, to be 
arbitrary; but Bloom simply shares in the Post-Structural hostility to traditional 
metaphysical claims about literary heritage. Such denials of metaphysical presence are 
sufficient cause to attack Bloom and all Post-Structural theory. Moreover, Bloom's 
admixture of Freudian angst, Nietzschean will to power, Deconstructionist slipperiness in 
regards to intent and meaning, and a thick layer of Gnostic mystical poetry seems rather 
more a concoction than a theory to most people. Bloom parlays his polymathic 
capaciousness into a very weird brew indeed, and as such, it is no surprise that few, after 
catching a whiff, are willing to drink deeply from the cup. 
8 
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That Bloom is often criticized, not for secularizing religious texts, but for the 
opposite, reveals both Bloom's discursive transgressions and the anxiety of his critics. In 
his article, "Reading Bloom (Or: Lessons Concerning the 'Reformation' of the Western 
Literary Canon)," James Baumlin argues that Bloom's critical vocabulary "reflects a 
habit of discourse all too common within English studies—that is, a habit, often 
unconscious, of saeralizing its discourse and confusing the distinctions between secular 
and religious texts, traditions, and canons" (par. 5). In particular, Baumlin sees Bloom's 
use of Kaballistic models as a sort of devious invocation of religious terminology4, noting 
that "[e]ven when most adamant in making distinctions, Bloom eannot abandon the 
analogies between religious and aesthetic experience" (n8). Baumlin's implication that 
Bloom might subvert religion by using its language towards a literary model in, say, 
Kaballah and Criticism, is reasonable; but Baumlin's argument is fundamentally more 
strict: religious and aesthetic language must not mix. Why this should be is presumably 
obvious to Baumlin; nevertheless, simply asking oneself why this must be does not 
suggest any immediate and conclusive answers that do not appeal to the sacred as a 
category. 
More overtly Christian critiques of Bloom, such as R.V. Young's "Harold Bloom: 
Critic as Gnostic," argue, predictably (and correctly), that Bloom's is a religious 
transgression: 
It is a grimly ironic truth that Bloom's own Gnostic Freudian treatment of 
literature and, above all, of authors, opened the gates to the postmodern assassins 
of the Party of Resentment, who now conduct their scornful ritual over the 'death 
of the author.' Finally, it is precisely his hostility to Christianity and his effort to 
4
 Baumlin writes: "Bloom knows (a good Gnostic, he) that only a few readers possess the heterodox 
esoteric traditions underlying his otherwise seemingly conservative arguments, and that a majority of his 
readers would be unsettled, even shocked, were they to grasp the full import of Bloom's 'religion of art,' as 
Paul Dean terms if' (par. 7). 
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displace it, spiritually and intellectually, which has resulted in the most grievous 
damage to the literary tradition that Bloom claims to love [...]. [H]e is blind to the 
intimate and indispensable bond between the secular 'canon' and the Faith 
informing its necessary model, the scriptural canon. Western civilization is the 
cultural embodiment of Christendom; when its cultural heart stops beating, all that 
is left is corpse. (19) 
Asserting that Western masterpieces are "Christian in their spiritual sources and 
traditional in their moral orientation" (29), Young scorns Bloom's mixture of Gnostic 
imagery, deconstructionist reading models, and his agonistic understanding of the poetic 
psyche as little more than "worship of the self' (21). Again, we see Bloom alone and 
without allies; in much the same way as Bloom's leftist critics might hector his stance 
that literature has no inherent social utility, we see Young in the same snit about Bloom's 
moral orientation. This is absence anxiety expressed as the shrill hectoring of moral 
turpitude on the grounds that advocacy of the self is spiritual onanism, unproductive, 
sociopathic, the very source of evil. 
But Bloom's theories have shown significant and less ambiguous problems. The most 
damaging refutation of Bloom's religious or mystical modes of understanding literature 
can be found in the critiques of his Hebrew. At issue is whether or not the central conceit 
in The Book of J—that the Tanakh was written by a woman who routinely challenged 
Yahweh's supremacy with her own poetic vitalism (Rosenberg 9-55)—was the result of 
intentional mistranslation of the "J" text. In Steven Grosby's "Men Blow Kisses to 
Calves" and David Stern's "The Supreme Fictionalist," Bloom's theories are not 
challenged as much as translator David Rosenberg's renderings of the "J" text, which 
Bloom used to support his assertions. Lining up Rosenberg's with the traditional 
translations, Grosby makes the compelling case that the "problem for Bloom is that [his] 
understanding of 'J' requires a perversion of the Hebrew" (iv). In particular, Grosby 
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argues that Bloom and Rosenberg aggressively suppress the message of humanity's 
necessary submission to God in favor of a reading that "seeks to deny an essential aspect 
of 'J , ' of the worship of Yahweh, and of all religion—the distinction between the sacred 
and the profane, between pure and impure, and the existence of absolute standards 
presupposed by this distinction" (iv). While not dismissing these suspect translations— 
and they are suspect—both critics demonstrate absence anxiety in their arguments: 
Bloom's reading of "J" denies absolute standards. And where would we be without 
those? 
David Stern praises Bloom for confessing his disinterest in the Jewish "normative 
tradition," but that only amounts to a backhanded compliment where we are to 
understand that tradition is "only to be overcome, to be escaped from" (emphasis added); 
Stern goes on to conclude that whatever the quality of the translations of "J," the problem 
for Bloom is that as a Gnostic or Kaballist his work "represents a tradition that preserves 
and transmits nothing" (par. 45). Again, the absence at the heart of Bloom's theory is 
what damns it. Grosby takes the considerably harsher line in his conclusion, calling 
Bloom a devil-worshipper, saying, "Bloom's perspective is a subjectivist, modern version 
of the worship of Baal" (iv). 
These exceptionally damning remarks illustrate the rancor that Bloom's arguments 
engender from traditionalists of several stripes,5 whose arguments bear a striking 
resemblance to those made by T.S Eliot in "Tradition and the Individual Talent." 
Young's rebuttal is virtually Eliot risen from the dead. According to David Stern, Eliot is 
5
 All are professors. Grosby teaches philosophy, Young and Baumlin teach English, and Stern teaches post-
biblical Hebrew literature. It seems clear that Young is a Christian, and Stern cites Gershom Scholem—one 
of Bloom's guides through the mysteries of Kabbalah—as an example of a pious Jew who "was wholly 
within the bounds of'normative' Jewish tradition. In fact, it is hard to conceive of anything more normative 
in Judaism than this kind of devotion, the 'piety' of the intellect" (par. 44). 
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the towering critical presence Bloom seeks to overcome, and for whom "[tjhe unity of 
European culture [...] was Christian culture" (par. 7). While he doesn't accuse Bloom of 
Baal-worship, Stern's suspicion is that Bloom is less resistant to Christian culture than to 
Eliot himself. Likewise, in arguing that Bloom's theory is essentially a misguided 
metaphor of power, Adam Kirsch believes that Bloom mistakes the relation of one poet 
to another with his own relation to Eliot: 
[...] what troubles Bloom about Eliot is not simply his authority, or the literary 
values he used to establish it. Neither is it the immense superiority of Eliot's prose 
to his own, or even the obvious fact that Eliot was a great poet as well as a critic, 
so that his criticism enjoys an immortality that Bloom's cannot hope to achieve. 
The real reason Eliot stands as Bloom's antithetical precursor is that he foretold 
what must become of a critic like Bloom — a critic who is not a poet, but 
passionately wants to assert his own personality, (par. 31) 
According to Kirsch, Eliot anticipated Bloom and all critics as secondary creatures, 
dependent on artists for their sustenance, and finally obsessed with power because of 
their necessary subservience to creative genius. While this observation has some merit as 
a kind of Bloomian analysis of Bloom, the argument against Bloom's theory still turns on 
the assumption that the conflation of literary and creative modes of reading and writing 
are fruitless. Kirsch's point is well taken; Bloom probably tells us more about the critic as 
reader than the poet as reader, much less the poet as writer. However, Kirsch (following 
Eliot) basically rejects Bloom's theories based on his lack of poems, which must be 
revealed for the power play it in fact is; there is no reason to privilege literary texts over 
critical ones, unless as a defense against them or an assault on them. Put another way, the 
supremacy of the literary, once advocated, reveals vulnerabilities and anxieties as much 
as it defends against them. 
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The anxiety of absence then, follows upon the recognition that these categories are 
finally arbitrary, which is to say man-made, and therefore metaphysically absent. What 
these aforementioned critics have in common in their assault on Bloom is an appeal to 
their own sacredness and quasi-mystical categories of experience that supposedly set 
such writings apart from all others, an appeal that is finally reductive of all other writings 
that are put outside of them. Bloom's mystical ruminations are out of bounds because 
they do not sufficiently revere these categories. Canonicity must maintain its religious 
taint. 
However, Bloom's crime—eonflating religion with literature with criticism with 
mysticism in his writing—is still, finally, just writing, and the need to organize and 
maintain such distinctions becomes something else. It becomes, to one way of reading, 
the anxiety of absence. To understand how, we must come to insist on this 
democratization—one that respects no bounds between rhetorics, as in the 
Deconstructionist mode, of which Bloom is a quasi-practioner—which allows us then to 
see the rich play of presence and absence. Indeed, what critics of Bloom universally fail 
to recognize is that to read him properly, or at least for presence and absence, requires, if 
not an outright abolition of discursive categories, then at least the recognition that such 
categories are rather more flexible than we might like; our resistance to such flexibility is 
finally our own. Put another way, Bloom's work suggests that reading experiences are 
rather often profoundly religious or mystic, and that the relation between a person—poet 
or critic—and a text—literary, critical, or what we call religious—is at once the 
interaction of one mind to another and the rich interplay of presence and absence on as 
many levels as we admit. 
Nietzsche, Derrida, and the Trace: Will and the Absence of Language 
One's response to Bloom is yoked to one's response to Friedrich Nietzsche, for 
Bloom's writing is suffused with Nietzschean influence. The first thing they share, and 
the first thing we encounter in each of them, is a combative writing style. For both, style 
directly corresponds to substance; "Every talent must unfold itself in fighting," Nietzsche 
wrote in "Homer's Contest," a phrase that was the "starting-point" for Bloom's Anxiety of 
Influence (Genius, 195), and which forms the basis of Bloom's understanding of poetic 
influence as the severe troping of one poet in reaction to another, a troping so violent as 
to be antithetical. "Tropes" in Bloom's conception are just as likely to turn back against 
the preceding thesis/poem as they are to turn away. Fight and flight are the only options 
for poets. 
Of course, antithesis is Nietzsche's philosophy in a nutshell. As a master of 
antithetical thinking, Nietzsche may well have troped the final trope and set us on the 
course to impossibility of originality, which allows Lentricchia to observe: "To say that 
[Bloom] is unoriginal is to indulge a myth that much of contemporary theory has laid to 
rest. Clearly Nietzsche implied it all; just as clearly, Bloom has made the Nietzschean 
insights count as no one before him has" (343). As the god-killing high priest of 
skepticism and perspectivism, Nietzsche is rightly the father of Post-Structuralism, but it 
is actually the Nietzschean will to power in Bloom's theory of influence (via Freud) that 
gives the moralists of all varieties fits. And, although Nietzsche often observes that power 
results in the unnatural and crippling mental states of the Christian psyche, the very 
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mention of will to power is more likely to inspire visions of blitzkriegs in the legions of 
poor misreaders of Nietzsche, readers who consider him the father of nihilism. But 
Nietzsche, like Freud and Bloom after him, was possessed of a will to truth, which 
(correctly or incorrectly) led to a diagnosis of human relations that was not as rosily 
teleological as that of the dominant Christian tradition. One hopes that this is merely bad 
press, bad readings; Nietzsche's diagnoses—the death of God, the shortcomings of 
language, the nihilism at the heart of Christian metaphysics—are too often confused with 
his prescriptions, prescriptions which are always as self-augmenting as this passage from 
The Gay Science: 
We have left the land and take to our ship! We have burned our bridges—more 
we have burned our land behind us! Now, little ship, take care! The ocean lies all 
around you; true, it is not always roaring, and sometimes it lies there as if it were 
silken and golden and a gentle favorable dream. But there will be times when you 
will know that it is infinite and that there is nothing more terrible than infinity 
[...J. Alas, if homesickness for land should assail you, as if there were more 
freedom there—and there is no longer a 'land'! (207) 
To consider oneself on one's own ship, as fundamentally adrift in an alternately beautiful 
and violent existence, is to live in danger of solipsism. But it is precisely Nietzsche's joy 
at the prospect of self-augmentation that makes his bleak observations of humanity 
bearable; indeed, the very chance to know a harsh truth is always an occasion for 
happiness in oneself, an opportunity to respond with will and strength. Bloom's theory of 
poetic influence has a similar effect on us; for some it may be too bleak and brutal to 
accept that the relations between artists are so fundamentally contentious, but such a 
thing does not trouble those for whom the will to power is a symptom of the human 
condition and who therefore take Nietzsche's advice when it comes to sad, hard facts. 
Poetic influence is an occasion for strength, the fertile ground for troping. 
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However much Nietzsche's will to power is identical to Bloom's theory of the agon 
between poets, a proper reading of Nietzsche-in-Bloom, must rather come through 
Nietzsche's atheism.6 In fact, it is only by passing through Nietzsche's observations of 
what we thought (and continue to think) of God, that we might understand the agony of 
influence and absence. Although the following is as shrill as any Sunday sermon, 
Nietzsche's astonishment at the absurdity of Christian faith is even today astonishingly 
apt: 
When on a Sunday morning we hear the bells ringing we ask ourselves: is it 
possible! this is going on because of a Jew crucified 2000 years ago who said he 
was the son of God. The proof of such an assertion is lacking. [...]. A god who 
begets children on a mortal woman; a sage who calls upon us no longer to work, 
no longer to sit in judgment, but to heed the signs of the imminent end of the 
world; a justice which accepts an innocent man as a substitute sacrifice; someone 
who bids his disciples drink his blood; prayers for miraculous interventions; sins 
perpetrated against a god atoned for by a god; fear of a Beyond to which death is 
the gateway: the figure of the Cross as the symbol in an age which no longer 
knows the meaning and shame of the Cross—how gruesomely all this is wafted to 
us, as if out of the grave of a primeval past! Can one believe that things of this 
sort are still believed in? {Human, All Too Human 169) 
While Nietzsche plucks at the fantastic absurdities of Christian faith, his astonishment 
resides in the proposition that this tale was made up, a fiction behind which hides a 
consciousness (collective or otherwise) no better than one's own, and by Nietzsche's 
lights, demonstrably worse. However, Nietzsche recognized and appreciated the value of 
the humanities for living, and is not necessarily arguing here against believing in stories. 
In "On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life," he argues that "history 
6
 The following, from Nietzsche's The Antichrist, is quoted in the section on him in Bloom's Genius, and 
illustrates their shared dismay at the Christian myth, and its nihilism: 
The Christian conception of God—God as god of the sick, God as a spider, God as spirit—is one of the 
most corrupt conceptions of the divine everxcv attained on earth. It may represent the low-water mark 
in the descending development of divine types. God degenerated into the contradiction of life, instead 
of being its transfiguration and eternal Yes! God as the declaration of war against life, against nature, 
against the will to live! God—the formula for every slander against 'this world,' for every lie about the 
'beyond'! God—the deification of nothingness, the will to nothingness pronounced holy! {The 
Antichrist 585-86). 
belongs to the preserving and revering soul—to him who with loyalty and love looks 
back on his origins; through this reverence he, as it were, gives thanks for his existence" 
(19). Again, his critique is against the specific tale being told, not that it is a tale or that it 
is believed. But what fuels his dismay is the utter lack of skepticism, the flaccid will (if 
you can call it "will") that accepts such fictions as gospel truth, and the unwillingness to 
contend with these fictions as such, to make new, better stories, histories, truths. 
Nietzsche is contemptuous of all who refuse to contest their past, a past which is not of 
their own design, and yet very well could be if they only had the will to re-read it. It is in 
this spirit—critical of the Christian message and yet cognizant of myths' nutrition for 
living—that I believe Bloom's aggressive or "strong" misreading of Milton's Paradise 
Lost in The Anxiety of Influence is fruitfully understood. 
Bloom and Nietzsche would agree that, as a theodicy, Paradise Lost is scarcely 
necessary, let alone successful; that is, Bloom is every bit as skeptical about Milton's 
Christian beliefs as Nietzsche, and Bloom's reading of Paradise Lost reflects this 
skepticism. Bloom's transformation of the poem into an allegory of relations between 
poets is vigorously antithetical to the religious content (that is, it is Nietzschean), and 
quite clearly derived from the poetry of those to whom his theory applies: the Romantics 
who adored Milton's Satan. And yet Bloom's trope on Nietzsche is to reorient the 
relation between Satan and God in Paradise Lost back towards the divine-man relation, 
in the service of "sacralizing" not only the poetry of the Romantics, but their very 
relationship to one another. In short, Bloom is writing a myth and theory at once, and 
again transgressing the religious category—and probably the poetic (as opposed to the 
critical)—as well. 
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How does Bloom's theory blur the distinctions between discourses? How is the 
relation between poets a divine-man relation? Bloom's reading of Paradise Lost, which 
opens the Anxiety of Influence, inflates the earliest moments in that poem, when Satan 
realizes that he is falling, to a climax. According to Bloom, poetry begins with the 
"awareness, not of a Fall, but that we are falling. The poet is our chosen man, and his 
consciousness of election becomes a curse [...]. 'I was God, I was Man (for a poet they 
were the same), and I am falling, from myself' (Anxiety of Influence 21). In Bloom's 
reading, this fall is a self-division, the discovery that one has been created by another— 
literally the author of one's truest self—and yet this other is not oneself. As Bloom says: 
When a potential poet first discovers (or is discovered by) the dialectic of 
influence, first discovers poetry as being both external and internal to himself, he 
begins a process that will end only when he has no more poetry within him, long 
after he has the power (or desire) to discover it outside himself again. Though all 
such discovery is self-recognition, indeed a Second Birth, and ought, in the pure 
good of theory, to be accomplished in a perfect solipsism, it is an act never 
complete in itself. Poetic Influence in the sense—-amazing, agonizing, 
delighting—of other poets, as felt in the depths of the all but perfect solipsist, the 
potentially strong poet. For the poet is condemned to learn his profoundest 
yearnings through an awareness of other selves. The poem is within him, yet he 
experiences the shame and splendor of being found by poems—great poems, 
outside him. To lose freedom in this center is never to forgive, and to learn the 
dread of threatened autonomy forever (25-26). 
It is at this point, in this profoundly miserable condition, that the poet begins to write. 
Satan lands in the fiery lake of not-self "(t)he dismal situation waste and wild, [...]. 
Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, where peace / And rest can never dwell, hope never 
comes [.. .]." {Paradise Lost I, 60-66), and yet the poet in him possesses something, 
though he be flung from himself, and so he "refuses to brood upon this, and turns instead 
to his task, which is to rally everything that remains" {Anxiety, 21). "What though the 
field be lost?" Satan says to his troops, rallying what remains in the Bloomian myth, for 
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"All is not lost; the unconquerable will [...] And courage never to submit or yield..." (I, 
106-08). What for Milton was surely the folly of over-reachers, becomes the great trope 
against history by the belated, those flung from themselves: 
Farewell happy fields 
Where joy for ever dwells: hail horrors, hail 
Infernal world, and thou profoundest hell 
Receive thy new possessor: one who brings 
A mind not to be changed by place or time. 
The mind is its own place, and in itself 
Gan make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven. 
What matter where, if I still be the same, 
And what should I be, all but less than he, 
Whom thunder hath made greater? Here at least 
We shall be free . . . (I, 249-55) 
But the freedom of hell is debt-ridden. The discovery in reading poetry—and, by 
extension, "reading" any art—is self-recognition, but not self-recovery, for the poet is 
flung from himself. "The alternative is to repent, to accept God altogether other than the 
self, wholly external to the possible," Bloom writes (21), and what he means is that the 
alternative to writing for the newborn poet is to deny that one has seen oneself in the 
predecessor's poem, has been created there. It is important to remember that Bloom is 
talking about the creation of poets; we may all be created in some sense by what we read, 
but what a poet sees in a poem is himself writing the poem that created him. Of course, 
this did not happen, but it is no less the case that the poet must now write poems, and 
those poems—all of them, in some crucial and heretofore overlooked way—are about this 
event of his creation. In this, Bloom is fruitfully read quite literally. The predecessor poet 
is God to the subsequent poet in the sense that what the ephebe most is, after 
encountering great poetry, is a poet; he was not a poet before he discovered himself in the 
poetry of another—he did not exist. 
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Of course, the predecessor is also "cultural history, the dead poets, the 
embarrassments of a tradition grown too wealthy to need anything more" (21), or put 
another way, persons and their arts, and we properly see how influence anxiety describes 
not only a relation between gods and people, but between consciousnesses, or people, 
with all of the psychic tensions that that entails; and so the distinctions between gods and 
men and the literary characters they create and are created by become subject to the 
crucial problem of absence. To discover a poet as one's God is to lose the God Nietzsche 
declared dead and absent, and to lose the poet to history is to lose him too, and all of this 
loss is to have lost the self (to have been flung from the self), which is to feel absence in 
at least three ways, all infinitely complicated and as personal as can be. The discourses of 
experience—religious, literary, psychological, and so on—are simply insufficient in 
themselves to the task of explaining what Bloom is talking about here. All Bloom knows, 
and wants to say, is that this is where poems come from. 
The implications are quite broad. For Nietzsche, the appropriate response to finding 
an absence behind a poem (or a moral, or a religion, or any idea, really) is to rewrite the 
poem and place the self there.7 Bloom's theory is really an exploration of this process as 
it can be traced in poetry, a process which "includes everything that we could ascribe as 
motivation for the writing of poetry that is not strictly devotional in its purposes," and 
"[t]o rally everything that remains, and not to sanctify nor propound." Satan, who is the 
apt model of this process, "organizing his chaos, imposing a discipline despite the visible 
7
 For Lentricchia, this is Satanic, but it is clear he doesn't mean that as favorably transgressive: "It is 
difficult to say what, outside of the testimony of the devil himself, would sanction [the] view of 
romanticism as the search for a unique and irreplaceable self which wants to articulate a uniquely original 
language. The preponderance of testimony of romantic poets and theorists since Wordsworth has claimed 
rather the opposite" (330), but that is precisely Bloom's point; irrespective of Wordsworth's intent, the 
Romantic movement is characterized by this transgressive self-augmenting aggression. 
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darkness, calling his minions to emulate his refusal to mourn, becomes a hero as poet, 
finding what must suffice, while knowing that nothing can suffice" {Anxiety, 22). The 
great difficulty for the poet is not discovering an absence behind a poem, but a god. If 
talent is revealed in fighting, the fight here is against one's creator and the stakes are as 
high as can be; as Bloom puts it in A Map of Misreading, "A poet [...] is not so much a 
man speaking to men as a man rebelling against being spoken to by a dead man [...] 
outrageously more alive than himself' (19)—which is again a conflation of God and man, 
for the predecessor poet is virtually immortal. To show talent is to fight against the 
creator of one's "profoundest yearnings," and Bloom knows that this is a battle between a 
god and a potential god, and—weaned on Freud—a fight fraught with despair. 
On this point, Satan's complaint in Book IV of Paradise Lost is instructive. After 
Satan notes the image of the sun "high in his meridian tower," he contemplates his lot 
and his options (IV, 30). The meridian, or noon, is a critical time of judgment here, a 
period when no shadow can be cast, where all is illuminated. It seems that at this time 
and place, Satan cannot lie, and must reckon with his fall in all honesty. He concedes that 
it was easy to praise God, easier still to serve him, and yet, as one "lifted up so high" (IV, 
49) he hated any subjugation whatsoever, despite God being the source of all his gifts and 
pleasure. It occurs to Satan that, had he been an angel of a lesser order, his ambitions 
would have been bounded on all sides by weakness. Further, Satan bemoans that he is 
himself in particular, for other powerful angels did not succumb to temptation, for none 
aspired as he. Satan's self-judgment that he is too large is to realize that God has made a 
creature who cannot bear His presence and yet mourns His absence. He is forced then, by 
the madness of this senseless choice between "Infinite wrath, and infinite despair" (IV, 
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64) to declaim to himself that evil shall be his good (99), to trope antithetically against 
his creator-precursor. A reading of Bloom's theory of the divine-man or creator-man 
relation between poets, as if the predecessor were some sort of Gnostic demiurge to the 
subsequent poet, allows us to see that the full title of Bloom's book—The Anxiety of 
Influence: A Theory of Poetry—is at last ironic; influence anxiety is not just a theory of 
poetic relations, but a theory of how poems are sacred texts of origins, stories of a 
person's creation, each one a book of Genesis and a Theogony. The "sacralizing" of texts 
cannot be gotten away from; it is precisely Bloom's point. 
If it seems too dubious to claim that Bloom is writing more than poetic theory, we 
must recognize that such transgressions are common, and go back at least as far as Plato, 
so long as Nietzsche is to be believed in claiming that the "special artistic significance in 
Plato's dialogues is [...J a contest with the art of the orators, and the dramatists of his 
time [...] enabling him to say in the end: 'Look, I too can do what my great rivals can do; 
indeed, I can do it better than they [... J and now I repudiate all this entirely and condemn 
all imitative art'" (Homer's Contest 37). Nietzsche's insight is this: Plato was first a poet, 
and Homer was his great predecessor. Again, every talent unfolds itself in fighting, and 
that fighting reveals new modes of thought; Plato is not remembered to us as a poet or 
dramatist, but his dialogues are richly dramatic and poetic while they "fight" with poetry 
and drama by changing the discourse—against writing, to dialogue, and towards 
philosophy. That we call Plato's writing "philosophy" is to forget that it is poetry and 
drama. Likewise, Bloom's theory of influence flouts categorization, and his version of 
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Paradise Lost is richly multivalent, or at least an attempt at such multivalence. 
8
 Lentricchia is aware of this as a transgression: "By calling the poem something that is composed of what 
the precursor writes, the ephebe's deliberate misreading of this, and the critic's deliberate misreading of the 
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It is at points such at this—when one is, say, making the outrageous argument that 
Harold Bloom is mythic theorist or some such—that the implications of Bloom's own 
notion of misreading are acutely felt. One picks and chooses phrases that augment his 
chief concern and feels the mischief inherent to misreading, but also a kind of loss, as if 
the words—those cherry-picked and one's own—were insufficient to the argument. All 
reading is misreading according to Bloom, which does not assuage the loss felt in that 
realization. "Whatever we have words for, that we have already got beyond," Nietzsche 
writes in Twilight of the Idols, "In all talk there is a grain of contempt" (530). This is one 
of Bloom's favorite quotes, and the translation he uses renders it "That for which we find 
words is something already dead in our hearts. There is a kind of contempt in the act of 
speaking." The difference is slight, but "dead in our hearts" seems more mournful of 
absence, which is probably why Bloom uses it. But all such losses are, again, 
opportunities for overcoming. 
Misreading, "poetic misprision," or clinamen, are all used to describe the same event 
of reading, a talent that is no less determined by fighting than any other. "Poems are 
written by men, and not by anonymous Splendors," Bloom writes in Anxiety of Influence, 
with all awareness that even religious texts are poems or writings, and then turns to the 
problem of will in reading: "The stronger the man, the larger his resentments, and the 
more brazen his clinamen. But at what price, as readers, are we to forfeit our own 
clinamen?" (43). For Bloom, the requirement of critics and readers is to read the poem as 
ephebe-precursor relationship, Bloom would grab for criticism a piece of the creative action" (338). 
Lentricchia is, in my opinion, completely correct, as is Nietzsche, whose comment in "Homer's Contest" 
seems apt for what Bloom himself is up to with respect to the category of literature: "the core of the 
Hellenic notion of the contest: it abominates the rule of one and fears its dangers; it desires, as a protection 
against the genius, another genius" (37). Bloom's grab for the "creative action" is—successful or not—his 
contest with genius. 
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"a poet's deliberate misinterpretation," and again we must look to Nietzsche to properly 
understand what Bloom means. 
For Nietzsche, atheism arises out of his disdain for Christian myth, but he is also 
astonished at Christian readers and their violence to Judaic tradition; noting in The Dawn 
that "the Bible is pricked and pulled and the art of reading badly formally inculcated 
upon the people," Nietzsche observes that "everywhere in the Old Testament there were 
supposed to be references to Christ and only to Christ, and particularly to his cross. 
Wherever any piece of wood, a switch, a ladder, a twig, a tree, a willow, or a staff is 
mentioned, this was supposed to indicate a prophecy of the wood of the cross [...]. Has 
anybody who claimed this ever believed it?" (81).9 As argued earlier, Nietzsche 
possessed a will to truth, and such dishonest "readings" appalled him, but it would be a 
mistake to think that "true" readings had any truck with him. Language was no vehicle 
for truth, any more than matter and energy cloaked the gears and workings of the 
universe,10 leading him to write towards the end of his philosophic life in the notes to 
Will to Power, "Against that positivism which stops before phenomena, saying, 'there are 
only facts,' I should say: no it is precisely facts that do not exist, only interpretations 
[...]" (458). This is Bloom's notion of reading as misreading: facticity, meaning, truth are 
9
 Harold Bloom finds this"reading badly" to be a prime example of misreading, saying in an interview 
with the Boston Globe in 2005, "I think the Greek New Testament is the strongest and most successful 
misreading of a great prior text in the entire history of influence. Everything in the New Testament is 
deliberately lined up so as to serve—so they say—as the ultimate fulfillment of the Hebrew Bible. But, 
historically speaking, I do not think the treatment Jews have received from Christians is any kind of 
fulfillment. Rather it's an endless-I must fall back on the Yiddish here-shandah [shame]" (par. 13). 
10
 From The Gay Science: "What is 'appearance' to me now! Certainly not the opposite of some kind of 
being—what can I possibly say about being of any kind that is not a predicate of appearance! Certainly not 
a dead mask placed over an unknown 'x,' which could, if one wished, be removed! Appearance is for me 
the active living itself, which goes so far in its self-mockery as to allow me to feel that there is nothing here 
but appearance and will-o'-the-wisp and a flickering dance of spirits" (206). 
25 
all lost, and all that reading distills down to is an opportunity to be strong or weak in the 
wake of that loss. 
Nietzsche is the eminent forerunner or father figure of post-structuralism in noting 
how metaphysically unmoored language truly is. His greatest essay on the topic, "On 
Truth and Lying in the Non-Moral Sense," is astonishingly rich for its brevity on a topic 
that would consume and vex literary studies and philosophy. "We believe that when we 
speak of trees, colours, snow, and flowers, we have knowledge of the things themselves, 
and yet we possess only metaphors of things which in no way correspond to the original 
entities" he writes (877), and the modes of thought that would characterize 
Deconstruction come spilling forth: 
What then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, 
anthropomorphisms, in short a sum of human relations which have been subjected 
to poetic and rhetorical intensification, translation, and decoration, and which, 
after they have been in use for a long time, strike a people as firmly established, 
canonical, and binding; truths are illusions of which we have forgotten that they 
are illusions, metaphors which have become worn by frequent use and have lost 
all sensuous vigour, coins which, having lost their stamp, are now regarded as 
metal and no longer coins. (878) 
Again, we feel absence (expressed here as old money!), this time a lack or gap in 
language that is severed from truth; that is, we feel—after Nietzsche—to have lost 
something, to realize again as we did before that what stands behind our existence-—as a 
poet, a reader, a Christian—is not just a person or even an idea, but a now-diminished 
discourse, a slippery relation between signifier and signified, a metaphor, a ghost, a trace. 
The implications are startling and troubling, and lead inevitably to the kind of discussion 
of presence and absence found in the work of Jacques Derrida, and in particular his book, 
Of Grammatology. 
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Derrida's goal in the essay is of a piece with that of Deconstruction: the endeavor of 
reading deconstructively is not to arrive at meaning, but to find the places where 
contradictions or double binds reveal the very problematic metaphysical claims made by 
any piece of writing. But in doing so, Derrida cleaves closely to the problem of presence 
and absence, using the tension as a metaphor for what language does most. Embellishing 
on Nietzsche, Derrida is aware that texts fight themselves, in some sense, by failing to be 
what they claim; for instance, Derrida takes issue with Rousseau's notion of his wife as a 
mediatory force in his thinking and writing, arguing that Rousseau's wife, in this 
example, could serve no such role because nothing outside language can mediate what is 
closed within language, which are words: "The intermediary is the mid-point and the 
mediation, the middle term, between total absence and the absolute plenitude of presence 
[...]. The play of substitution fills and marks a determined lack" (emphasis added 1824). 
It is significant that Derrida is not simply parroting the Nietzschean line that language 
is problematic in its empty appeals to metaphysical foundations. Derrida tropes on 
Nietzsche by arguing that reading is not just an act of will—-interpretation—but crucially 
trapped within the text; an interpretation cannot appeal to anything outside of the text, 
even the Self. Indeed, the Self is absent: 
What we have tried to show [... J is that in what one calls the real life of these 
existences of 'flesh and bone,' beyond and behind what one believes can be 
circumscribed as Rousseau's text, there has never been anything but writing; there 
have never been anything but supplements, substitutive significations which could 
only come forth in a chain of differential references, the 'real' supervening, and 
being added only while taking on meaning from a trace and from an invocation of 
the supplement, etc. And thus to infinity, for we have read, in the text, that the 
absolute present, Nature, that which words like 'real mother' name, have always 
already escaped, have never existed; that what opens meaning and language is 
writing as the disappearance of natural presence. (1826) 
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What emerges from this rumination on Rousseau is a notion that writing—-all 
writing—seeks to hide itself by appealing to that outside of the text, so that "effacing 
itself in the face of the signified content which it transports and in general teaches" 
(1826) is an essentially transcendent act, or an attempt at one. For Derrida, our reading 
should be aware that writing has "lent itself to this transcendent reading, in that search 
for the signified which we here put in question, not to annul it but understand it within a 
system to which such a reading is blind" (1827). To Derrida, what writing fundamentally 
claims to do—to refer to a reality outside itself—it cannot support or evince. Language is 
not just the play of interpretations; such "writing that is yet reading" is at once presence-
making in hiding itself, and absence-yielding when its depths are plumbed. At most, 
Derrida finds what he calls a "trace," which is what one feels to be a thing behind 
language—Self, say—but is also a clever wordplay suggesting partially erased text, 
absence, and the primacy of language even in our sense of a ghostly Self that has flitted 
out of language. The full import of Nietzsche's notion of words as things already dead in 
our hearts is realized. 
Harold Bloom, as part of the "Yale School" where Deconstruction first engaged the 
American literary scene, is well versed in this development of Nietzsche's skepticism. 
But in this Bloom again confounds discursive categories, arguably more so than Derrida 
In some sense, Bloom's notion of misreading is a clinamen or swerve from the Derridean 
criticism of reading as the mistaken sense of presence: misreading is just as apt to lead to 
a very significant psychic presence, which is influence. Seen this way, Bloom and 
Derrida are figures of presence and absence, respectively. Couching presence in terms of 
the struggle for artistic freedom, Bloom observes in his essay, "Breaking of the Forms," 
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[FJreedom, in a poem, must mean freedom of meaning, the freedom to have 
meaning of one's own. Such freedom is wholly illusory unless it is achieved 
against a prior plenitude of meaning, which is tradition, and so also against 
language [..,] which can be conceived in two valid ways, as I have learned, 
slowly and reluctantly. Either one can believe in a magical theory of all language, 
as the Kabbalists, many poets, and Walter Benjamin did, or else one must yield to 
a thoroughgoing linguistic nihilism, which in its most refined form is the mode 
now called Deconstruction. (4) 
Bloom's stance towards Deconstruction is finally dismissive; in large part, it is Derrida's 
notion of trace, which we may read here as the Self, that Bloom finds so repugnantly 
nihilistic. Lentricchia believes that Bloom's position towards Deconstruction is based on 
an objection to the way Derrida "situates" the subject within language, which 
means to subvert the traditional Western humanist perspective on the theme of 
free subjectivity, to place the subject as a function within a system of writing. 
There is no prelinguistic ontological subject; no meaning-authorizing inner space 
of the self; no ground for expression outside of an expressive medium itself. What 
we find 'inside' [...] is not a spirituality, or presence that evades the flood of 
textuality, but a sort of protowriting which he calls the 'trace': the subject is seen 
as essentially text, caught and engulfed by the truly authoritative forces of 
ecriture. (333) 
Arguing, rightly, that Bloom is deeply resistant to such a "situated" Self, Lentricchia 
comes to the conclusion that "Bloom's critique of Derrida becomes anxiety ridden 
rhetoric, not argument; assertion, not analysis" (335). To this critique, one might add 
Bloom's own revelation as "valid," a "magical theory of all language"; what, after all, 
could be less analytic? Lentricchia, for whatever reason, is finally more moved by 
Derrida's profundities than Bloom's, but it is a mistake to judge, as he does, that "both 
Bloom and Derrida present, the former unintentionally but as formidably, antihumanist 
theories of the self' (336). To properly "situate" the subject in language, as Derrida does, 
is judged by Bloom to make life meaningless or nihilistic, to be trapped by the language 
that creates us (in that it cannot be got behind or beyond), and to violate its real utility, 
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according to Nietzsche, "as an aid and remedy in the service of growing and striving life" 
(The Gay Science 132). If anything, Bloom's theory of the Self crosses into the divine, as 
in the relation between creator/precursor and created/ephebe, and is the transmission of 
that secular divinity, which practically means a religion of self-augmenting presence in 
the imagination of William Shakespeare: 
Bardolatry, the worship of Shakespeare, ought to be even more a secular religion 
than it already is. The plays remain the outward limit of human achievement [...]. 
They abide beyond the mind's reach; we cannot catch up to them. Shakespeare 
will go on explaining us, in part because he invented us. {Shakespeare: Invention 
of the Human xvii) 
This notion of Shakespeare's "invention of the human" is as literal as anything Bloom 
has ever written, and set against Derridean absence in language that hides only itself, 
makes the only argument left: language is magic and writers are gods. In this, Bloom's 
writings are indebted to Emerson and Gnosticism, to which we now turn. 
Emerson, Gnosticism, and the Spark of the Eternal Within: A Story of Presence 
The Ignorance concerning the Father produced Anguish and Terror. And the Anguish 
became dense like a fog so that no one could see... It was a great marvel that they 
were in the Father without knowing Him and that it was possible for them to escape 
outside by their own will because they could not understand and know Him whom 
they were. 
-"Gospel of Truth" by Valentinus 
Friedrich Nietzsche's vision of the little ship cited earlier—on an infinite sea where 
one realizes "there is nothing more terrible than infinity" and where "there is no longer a 
'land'!"—is a fantasy and, as such, an anxiety. Few writers seem more resistant to "the 
embarrassments of a tradition grown too wealthy to need anything more" (Anxiety of 
Influence 21) than Nietzsche, and this dream of space, of absence, betrays a great anxiety 
of influence. This is not to overlook how we profit from Nietzsche's critique of tradition 
and its manufacture, but there is no denying what need a vision of absence meets: psychic 
space. Although Bloom credits Nietzsche's argument that "talent must unfold itself in 
fighting" for sparking his theory of influence, it is Nietzsche's very antithetical 
orientation to tradition, and the anxieties that underlie such an orientation, which also 
must constitute Bloom's debt to Nietzsche. 
There is a corresponding dream in another of Bloom's great influences, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson. According to Bloom, Emerson seems relatively free of influence1, but like 
Nietzsche's little ship, Emerson's great imaginative symbol—-the "transparent eyeball"— 
is also a fantasy and an anxiety. Appearing in his first book, Nature, the transparent 
1
 Save in Emerson's effusive praise of Shakespeare in his Representative Men essays, which for Bloom is a 
case for Bardolatry. See 342-44 of Bloom's Genius. 
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eyeball is Emerson's great image of an infinite capaciousness. After observing in the 
introduction that his place in history is "retrospective," and that "foregoing generations 
beheld God and nature face to face," he asks, "Why should not we also enjoy an original 
relation to the universe?" (9). Emerson feels precisely the belatedness that Bloom 
describes, the kind of spiritual anxiety about the "Father" that Valentinus describes in the 
epigram introducing this section; but Emerson quickly moves, or tropes, on this anxiety 
towards a vision of solitude so total that the Self all but disappears: 
In the woods, we return to reason and faith. There I feel nothing can befall me in 
life,—no disgrace, no calamity (leaving me my eyes), which nature cannot repair. 
Standing on the bare ground,—my head bathed by the blithe air and uplifted into 
infinite space,—all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eyeball; I am 
nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am 
part or parcel of God. (11) 
As a fantasy of unlimited capacity for experience (the eyeball sees, is not itself seen, and 
never fills), this dream belies a great anxiety of absence. The Gnostic Valentinus 
describes such an anxiety as a "fog," which seems aptly troublesome to the metaphor of a 
transparent eyeball, for if there is one thing that turns Emerson's metaphor of infinite 
capacity into a powerless nullity, it is the nightmare of fog. 
This very problem in Emerson's thought, like Bloom's, has many contact points with 
Gnosticism. Hans Jonas' The Gnostic Religion is an excellent guide to this lost religion, 
and lays out the historical situation that allowed for Gnostic mysticism to flourish. Jonas 
explains how Gnosticism developed out of the syncretism of middle and near eastern 
mystical cults, Greek theoretical thought (in the wake of Plato and Aristotle), and 
dualistic religions of salvation—Christianity, of course, but also messianic Judaism— 
which were ascendant in the centuries immediately before and after Christ. Jonas 
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describes a rapidly and variously mutating religion that made use of every handy 
tradition, but with decidedly strange results. 
Much of what survives of Gnostic thought is preserved in the writings of early 
Christian apologists, but the main tenets derive from a dualism so complete that "[t]he 
transcendent God Himself is hidden from all creatures and is unknowable by natural 
concepts. Knowledge of Him requires supranatural revelation and illumination and even 
then can hardly be expressed otherwise than in negative terms" (Jonas 42-43). In brief, 
the Gnostics seem to have believed that the God of Judaic and Christian tradition was 
Himself a secondary (or tertiary) being who created the world we inhabit, and, depending 
on the Gnostic sect, was to some degree hostile or malevolent to his own creation. 
Central to this hostility was absence; the Gnostics believed that the ultimate God was far 
removed from our reality, a reality created by an "archon," usually identified with the 
God of Genesis, the Fall, the Flood, and Job's torments. Among Christian Gnostics, Jesus 
Christ was seen as a messenger from the true highest God, come to enlighten and liberate 
mankind by making us aware of the "pneuma" or divine spark that inhabits each person. 
"In its unredeemed state the pneuma thus immersed in soul and flesh is unconscious of 
itself, benumbed, asleep, or intoxicated by the poison of the world: in brief, it is 
'ignorant.' Its awakening and liberation is effected through 'knowledge'," Jonas writes, 
in summarizing Gnostic thought on reality (44); what is most eternal about us is of the 
Father but also terribly remote from him. Moreover, only by coming into knowledge of 
one's own pneuma can this separation be bridged. 
The striking parallel between Gnosticism and Emerson's thought is the problem of an 
absent God, and the troping or defense against the anxiety of absence or anguish 
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concerning the Father in Gnosticism. While his Nature shows Emerson's troping, the 
absence anxiety itself is most evident in Emerson's "Divinity School Address." 
Essentially Emerson's letter of resignation from the Unitarian church, the address reveals 
Emerson's defense against absence expressed as a claim of Gnosis. Ostensibly a critique 
of the church that has "fallen into the error that corrupts all attempts to communicate 
religion" (78) the address is quite a bit more than a criticism of the church's rhetorical 
approach; Emerson, like all apostates, must contend with what he loses, a lost god, which 
he must replace or refute, but in any case, cannot keep. 
Emerson opens the "Divinity School Address" with the lustrous image of nature: 
"Through the transparent darkness the stars pour their almost spiritual rays. Man under 
them seems a young child, and his huge globe a toy [...]. The mystery of nature was 
10 
never displayed more happily" (72). But quickly, an existential angst creeps in as he 
asks, 
What am I? What is? asks the human spirit with a curiosity new-kindled, but 
never to be quenched. Behold these outrunning laws, which our imperfect 
apprehension can see tend this way and that, but not come full circle. Behold 
these infinite relations, so like, so unlike; many, yet one. I would study, I would 
know, I would admire forever. (73) 
An apprehension of nature inspires angst, but Emerson suggests that such a sense of 
nature clues us in to "the presence of certain divine laws [that] refuse to be adequately 
stated. They will not be written out on paper, or spoken by the tongue [... J, They elude 
our persevering thought; yet we read them hourly in each other's faces, in each other's 
actions, in our own remorse" (73). By stating that divine law has no place in words, 
Emerson claims a knowledge not unlike that of the Gnostic. Such knowledge is internal 
12
 The remarkable receptivity here is classical in scope; as Bloom notes in several places in his own work, 
the root of "influence" originally described the idea that stars imparted some substance through the ether to 
inspire people. "Influenza" has the same root, though Bloom doesn't choose to remind us of that. 
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and secret and cannot be spoken, but it is there, nonetheless. There is presence, though it 
cannot be fixed by words. And yet, Emerson notes a curious condition: we seem to be 
• 13 
hourly in a state of remorse. If there is a sense of the Fall in Emerson, it is here. 
Greater assertions of presence emerge in the "Divinity School Address," where 
absence and Otherness are simply denied. Emerson argues that there is no necessary 
separation, that there was no Fall: "The intuition of the moral sentiment is an insight of 
the perfection of the laws of the soul [.. .J. If man is at heart just, then in so far is he God; 
the safety of God, the immortality of God, the majesty of God do enter into that man with 
justice" (74). This idea probably upset a good number of his audience for the audacity of 
claiming that God enters one, as opposed to his grace. In particular the phrase, "then in 
so far is he God," seems designed to be misread; it can mean the extent that a man's 
heart is just is the extent of God's presence in the man or, more outrageously, it can mean 
the man with a just heart is God. That Emerson keeps the meaning ambiguous 
necessarily leaves the distinction between man and the divine ambiguous; moreover, the 
similarity to Bloom's precursor-ephebe relation as a divine-human relation is curious. 
Strikingly, Emerson insists on using Christ's humanity as an exemplar of this presence: 
"One man was true to what is in you and me. He saw that God incarnates himself in man, 
and evermore goes forth anew to take possession of his World."14 The implication of 
Emerson's Christ is that a human can take possession of God once he perceives the 
divine law, law that is plain in so much of nature and in humanity. This conception of 
13
 It isn't too hard to imagine Emerson as more often sad than happy, despite the general cheer in his 
writing; not long after his first wife's death, he wrote in his journal, "I visited Ellen's tomb & opened the 
coffin." Three years before this address at Harvard, he wrote, "After thirty a man wakes up sad every 
morning excepting perhaps five or six until the day of his death." 
14
 Surely there were gasps when Emerson said, "the fear of degrading the character of Jesus by representing 
him as a man;—indicate with sufficient clearness the falsehood of our theology" (87). Yet, by the 1880s, 
his view on Christ was accepted Unitarian doctrine. 
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Christ is practically identical to the pneuma-revealing figure of Christian Gnosticism. But 
again, the curious thing is that the distinction between the divine and the human is 
diminished, and as such represents a trope against absence. 
Once one examines the address closely, another parallel with Gnosticism emerges: as 
a statement of mystical Gnosis, and as argument, the address doesn't hold. In part, 
Emerson's trope to merge man and God depends on words that cannot be said, cannot be 
wrenched into sense; it is simply impossible to accept his notion that the divine law 
cannot be stated, and yet fault the church that "the Moral Nature [...] is not explored as 
the fountain of the established teaching in society" (81). How the church is to teach what 
cannot be put in words is not clear. Emerson further complicates matters, saying, 
"[a]lways the seer is a sayer. Somehow his dream is told; somehow he publishes it with 
solemn joy: sometimes with pencil on canvas [...] but clearest and most permanent in 
words''' (81). Such contradictions evaporate any sense that might have accreted to his 
argument against the church, and what is left is an assertion of presence that is pre-lingual 
and mystical, and yet somehow permanent in words. 
Read for presence and absence, what one sees in Emerson's address is far more ironic 
than he intended. In his lack of argument, passages rife with absence anxiety leap forth, 
passages that preach something just short of solipsism as a kind of cure. Interestingly, one 
of Bloom's revisionary tropes—askesis, the move a poet makes to purge the self of a 
precursor, and which results in a strong self-estrangement from all traces of that 
precursor—ends at the verge of solipsism. It is plausible that the "Divinity School 
Address" shows a similar trope (but one of gathering rather than purging, for Emerson's 
dream is always of gathering), which ends on the verge of solipsism as well. Bloom could 
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be writing of Emerson when he says, "Elaborating ourselves, we become both 
Prometheus and Narcissus; or rather only the truly strong poet can go on being both, 
making his culture, and raptly contemplating his own central place in it" (Anxiety of 
Influence 119). Emerson's trope to identify God with the Self—over and over in his 
writing—seems to meet the terms of Bloom's askesis, and the dominant psychic action in 
"The Divinity School Address" is just such troping against absence. Read for it, the 
following all suggest a terror of separation from ultimate presence: 
• "All evil is so much death or nonentity" (75), speaks to the nothingness outside 
of God. 
• The man without God "bereaves himself of power, or auxiliaries; his being 
shrinks out all remote channels, he becomes less and less, a mote, a point, until 
absolute badness is absolute death" (75); such a man shows the wages of absence. 
• All existence verily depends on presence, for the "absence of this primary faith 
is the presence of degradation [...]. Let this faith depart, and the very words it 
spake and the things it made become false and hurtful. Then falls the church, the 
state, art, letters, life" (77). 
• Finally, to not have God within is itself a killer, for "that which shows God out 
of me, makes me a wart and a wen. There is no longer any reason for my being. 
Already the long shadows of untimely oblivion creep over me, and I shall decease 
forever" (79). 
Evil is absence. Losing divine presence is to shrink into a mote and death. God's 
presence must be within. While the anxiety of absence abates in subsequent writings, it is 
important to recognize in this early address in his career as a Transcendentalist, 
37 
Romantic, essayist, and poet—a non-denominational Christian or Christian Gnostic, in 
any case—the stresses caused by absence, and the tropes employed to overcome them. 
But it may also to be doubted that the sage of Concord ever suffered an absence 
anxiety, or was a Gnostic in any way. As transcendental poet and philosopher, Emerson's 
affinities with Romanticism—a recognition of the sublime in nature, a Wordsworthian 
value of plain speech, and a sense of the divine laws of the universe apprehendable 
through pure experience—don't suggest an anguished and terrorized Valentinian Gnostic. 
Indeed, the whole of Romanticism is hard to read as late Gnosticism. Making just this 
point about Bloom's theory of influence, Frank Lentricchia argues that 
the primary movement within the romantic consciousness is toward linkage and 
mooring of the self in the natural world; [...] the great dread, in other words, is 
just this gnostic severance from things, a severance which leads to the apocalyptic 
casing out of nature [...]. [GJnosticism is the inevitable fear of romantics, not 
their inevitable religion. (340-41) 
As in other instances, Lentricchia's analysis of Bloom seems correct, but as Valentinus 
suggests, ignorance about the Father—who is figure for, among other things, origins, or 
God—causes terror. Lentricchia has it backwards here: Agnosis—the absence of 
knowledge—is the "great dread" of the Romantics, and all their "linkage and mooring of 
the self' is itself a claim of Gnosis, an anxiety of absence, or the play of presence and 
absence; that is, mooring the self in nature is to "presence" oneself and nature, and is in 
some sense a trope against the limitations of language, a denial (and overcoming?) of the 
traps of language that Derrida points out. Or it is to fall into just such a trap as Derrida 
warns us about. 
In any case, Bloom's observation in Kabbalah and Criticism about the futility of an 
over-rational kind of critical reading and writing seems apt; he argues against the True 
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and False as a "too-large vista," urging that we seek instead "the narrower and more 
poetic area of love/hate relationships, for psychic ambivalence is the natural context in 
which the reading of poetry takes place" adding, "it would be a hopeless quest for 
criticism to follow philosophy in its benighted meanderings after truth" (124). Bloom 
wants us to read for the tensions of presence and absence, Gnosis and Agnosis, the ratios 
of psychic stuff to psychic space, played out in very personal contexts of "psychic 
ambivalence," also known as poems. According to Bloom, reading for "psychic 
ambivalence" is to pursue the central problem in poetry: "an honest acceptance of an 
actual dualism as opposed to the fierce desire to overcome all dualisms" (Anxiety of 
Influence 33), and this problem is one of presence and absence. To honestly accept "an 
actual dualism" is to accept separation or absence, and "to overcome all dualisms" is to 
take the extreme position that there is no separation or absence, it is to moor the self 
psychically with God, or in nature, or, in the case of poetry, to do all kinds of violence to 
poetic forebears in imagining a need for one's own poems. 
Bloom's theory unfolds or expands outside of the literary when he argues that the 
problem of originality becomes a crisis of origins, observable in poem after poem. In 
Kaballah and Criticism, he writes that "there is a general principle to be extracted; so 
many strong poems of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries open with dialectical images 
of presence and absence [...] because of the hiddenness of their immediate origins" (68). 
Of course, those origins are other poems, but these dialectics of presence and absence 
speak to the profound agony of Agnosis with respect to ultimate origins; we doubt now 
that burning bushes ever spoke, but we must remember that we always doubted. Indeed, 
the very existence of such fictions (which is to include all scripture and to know them in 
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the Nietzschean sense as perspectival) speaks to absence anxiety and serves the psychic 
need (or defense) to write down God and thereby fix our lives with presence. Emerson, 
accepting that bushes spoke to our forebears—"foregoing generations beheld God and 
nature face to face; we, through their eyes"—begs the wherefore of belatedness: "Why 
should not we also enjoy an original relation to the universe?" Emerson, much less a poet 
than an essayist, knows that this question is not only for artists. 
An interesting dialogue between Bloom, Emerson, and Nietzsche on the troping 
against belatedness emerges. As stated earlier, Nietzsche argues in "On the Advantage 
and Disadvantage of History for Life" that history has the power to justify us, and to 
make us thankful. Elsewhere in that short work, Nietzsche observes the benefit of a 
forgetful soul: 
What such a nature cannot muster it knows how to forget; it no longer exists, the 
horizon is closed and whole, and nothing can serve as a reminder that beyond this 
horizon there remain men, passions, doctrines and purposes. And this is a general 
law: every living thing can become healthy, strong, and fruitful only within a 
horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself or, on the other hand, 
too selfish to restrict its vision to the limits of a horizon drawn by another, it will 
wither away feebly or overhastily to its early demise. (10) 
It is perhaps to be expected that Nietzsche would extol the virtue of such a wonderful 
space-making skill as forgetfulness. Curiously, Emerson seems passionately unhistorical 
as well—in Self-Reliance, in particular—and he seems to crave a state of eternity, or the 
absence of history altogether.15 But for Emerson the absence of history is not 
forgetfulness, and the forgetful soul of Nietzsche indicts the transparent eyeball as a 
fantasy of infinite capacity, a fantasy that succumbs to the despair of absence; in 
Nietzsche's judgment, it would seem, Emerson draws no horizon and is therefore 
15
 "There is no history, only biography" is one of Bloom's favorite Emersonian aphorisms. 
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condemned to wither away.16 For Bloom the differences between Emerson and Nietzsche 
are not as dire, and the ways in which they trope against influence are at least interesting-. 
On the one hand, there is Nietzsche's parodist rhetoric and his bewildering 
perspectivism. On the other, there is Emerson's subtle antinomianism of rhetoric, 
and the outrageousness of his general advice [...]. Still, the difference can be 
defined, and it is this: for Nietzsche, the trope is an error, albeit necessary and 
valuable; for Emerson, the trope is a defense, a life-enhancing defense. (Kabbalah 
and Criticism 118) 
Nietzsche, aware that behind every perspective is a person, asserts that every trope is a 
fight, and no trope arrives at anything like a correct perspective. But for Emerson this 
troping is something else. Bloom says of Emerson that "every trope burns away context, 
and when enough context has been dissolved, a pragmatic fresh center appears" where he 
"cheerfully concedes the final reliance of the self upon the self, its condition of perfect 
sphericity" (Kabbalah and Criticism 121). Putting this another way in A Map of 
Misreading, Bloom writes, "Emerson had come to prophecy not a de-centering [...] but a 
peculiarly American re-centering" (176). It seems, then, that Bloom finds both men 
troping strongly—Emerson by insisting on his own centrality, and Nietzsche by having 
the psychic brawn to move from perspective to perspective without losing the self. In 
some sense, the strong troping of both Emerson and Nietzsche become the same thing: 
strong tropes, and the metaphors for describing it—the little ship, the transparent 
eyeball—become versions of the same psychic event. For example, Nietzsche's 
demy stification of history observes the necessity of an unhistorical or Emersonian re-
centered state for creativity, which, it seems, redeems Emerson by overcoming 
16
 Nietzsche was rather fond of Emerson, but among the scant comments Nietzsche made on Emerson, this 
remark from a letter to Nietzsche's friend Overbeck seems to capture Nietzsche's ambivalence about 
Emerson's work: "I don't know how much I would give if only I could bring it about, ex post facto, that 
such a glorious, great nature, rich in soul and spirit, might have gone through some strict discipline, a really 
scientific education. As it is, in Emerson, we have lost a philosopher^.. (440) 
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belatedness in another metaphor of consumption, not terribly unlike the transparent 
eyeball: 
[The unhistorical condition] is the most unjust condition in the world, narrow, 
ungrateful to the past, blind to dangers, deaf to warnings, a little living whirlpool 
in a dead sea of night and forgetting: and yet this condition-unhistorical, contra-
historical through and through-is the cradle not only of an unjust but rather of 
every just deed; and no artist will paint his picture [...] without first having 
desired and striven for it in such an unhistorical condition. (11) 
This anticipates Bloom's revisionary ratio of askesis; the little ship in Nietzsche's 
metaphor becomes a whirlpool—the only living thing—in a dead sea, and like the 
transparent eyeball or the little ship, the whirlpool is a metaphor free of any living Other. 
Everything—history, matter, Other, God—is within, dead, or forgotten. In the end, the 
difference scarcely matters. 
It is perhaps clear now how Emerson, Nietzsche, and Bloom all speak to the necessity 
of the "almost-solipsism" of askesis. But Bloom, curiously enough, tropes again. 
Observing Emerson's "perfect sphericity" in Kabbalah and Criticism as an "ultimate 
defense or trick, which is that it must be misinterpreted by [any] other self whatsoever," 
Bloom goes on to argue, along with Nietzsche, that presence is so much illusion, quoted 
here at length: 
1. There is the religious illusion, that a poem possesses or creates a real presence. 
2. There is the organic illusion, that a poem possesses or creates a kind of unity. 
3. There is the rhetorical illusion, that a poem possesses or creates a definite form. 
4. There is the metaphysical illusion, that a poem possesses or creates meaning. 
The sad truth is that poems don't have presence, unity, form, or meaning. 
Presence is a faith, unity is a mistake or even a lie, form is a metaphor, and 
meaning is an arbitrary and now repetitious metaphysics [...]. Alas, a poem, has 
nothing, and creates nothing. Its presence is a promise, part of the substance of 
things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. Its unity is in the good will of its 
reader. Its form is another version of the inside/outside metaphor of the dualizing 
Post-Cartesian West, which means that form in poetry is always merely a change 
in perspective. Finally, its meaning is just that there is, or rather was, another 
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poem. A poem is a substitution for a lost first chance [...]. (Kabbalah and 
Criticism 122) 
It seems that Bloom's meditations on Emerson and Nietzsche finally fold back to his own 
theory of influence: all poems are lost first chances, too late, too burdened with a 
presence that isn't really there. However, in the passage just cited, the harshness of the 
rhetoric, the insistence that poetry creates "nothing," and the conclusive sadness of a "lost 
first chance" is devastating. While Nietzsche's shrillness finally serves his great wit, this 
passage from Bloom has no wit; we must turn to Gnostics like Valentinus to find such 
anguish as this passage reveals. And it is via Gnosticism that Bloom himself finally 
overcomes the sadness of the lost chance, and partakes in a theory of language as magic 
or divinity, a vehicle for awakening the pneuma called Kabbalah. 
In Kabbalah and Criticism, Bloom explains how the vision of God in Kabbalah—the 
mystical Jewish offshoot of Gnosticism—was unknowable and without end, literally 
without attributes. For Bloom, Kabbalah is a useful model of literary theory, but 
Kabbalah's inheritance from Gnosticism is essential to understanding what kind of model 
it is, and at its center is the problem of a distant God—a metaphor of absence. 
Parallels between Bloom's own thinking and what we know of Gnosticism emerge. 
The syncretistic element of Gnostic thought bears resemblance to Bloom's discursive 
transgressions; both Gnosticism and Bloom appropriate what modes suit them. As Jonas 
notes, Gnostic thought found use for Greek theoretical modes of thinking to unlock what 
abstract concepts were buried in Oriental symbols and images, and had learned "to bring 
its ideas into the form of theories and to employ rational concepts, instead of sensuous 
imagery alone, in expounding them" (21). That such an observation can be applied to 
Bloom should not be terribly surprising; his vigorous misreading of Paradise Lost is not 
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just an application of Freudianism to a literary work. As previously argued, Bloom's 
approach is at once sacralizing and theoretical; to say that Shakespeare invented us is to 
have a totemic and generative view of literature, to say that art invents life, as strange as 
that sounds. And yet all that Bloom does in this regard seems less strange the more one 
learns of Gnosticism. Bloom is clearly attracted to Gnostic thought for its syncretism. 
The use of Paradise Lost by Bloom is also transcendent. Noting that in Gnostic 
thought a "pre-cosmic fall of part of the divine principle underlies the genesis of the 
world and of human existence" (63), Jonas could also be describing Bloom's misreading 
of Paradise Lost. Indeed, in Bloom there is no mistaking the dualistic Gnostic influence, 
for when the poet "comes crashing down in the Creation-Fall, he swerves, and this parody 
of the Lucretian clinamen, this change from destiny to slight caprice is [...] the Urizenic 
equivalent of the hapless errors of re-creation made by the Platonic demiurge" (Anxiety of 
Influence 42). Although the Platonic and Gnostic demiurges are not identical, what they 
share is an intermediate status between the heavenly Father/eternal order and humanity. 
What is important to Bloom is that this fall, "the central working concept of the theory of 
Poetic Influence" (42), is, in Gnosticism, "a voluntary element in the downward 
movement of the divine" resulting in the "world itself' {The Gnostic Religion 63, 
emphasis added). Clearly, Bloom's theory of Poetic Influence trades on the transcendent 
(or descendent) rhetoric by which Gnosticism describes the very creation of the universe; 
but it also links Poetic Influence with the very energies that Gnosticism describes as 
creating the universe, energies that are downward- and upward-tending. The relation 
between poetic influence and Gnosticism is this: the Fall is the anguish and terror of 
separation from the Father, what Bloom calls in The Anxiety of Influence the awareness 
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that one has fallen away from himself—profoundest absence anxiety—and the upward-
tending is the recognition of the archon or predecessor poet, or the anxiety of influence. 
The ultimate origin of poet and Gnostic is obscured; all that remains is this rich play of 
presence and absence. 
Another shared attribute of Gnosticism and Poetic Influence is the complaint that 
comes with having attained Gnosis; in terms of Bloom's theory, Gnosis is the moment 
one is created as poet in reading a poem, and the newly "knowing" soul, according to 
Jonas, 
far from being appeased by the awakening and the reminder of its origin, is 
powerfully stirred up by them and becomes a main concern of the gnosis just 
initiated. This query is even called 'the lawsuit concerning the world' which 
Adam is to present directly to the First Life itself. (88) 
Satan's complaint in Paradise Lost (that God made him strong enough to contend but not 
strong enough to win out—which is the complaint of the ephebe against the precursor in 
Bloom) is found in the "lawsuit concerning the world" of the Gnostics. The Gnostics, like 
Satan, take a defensive position against the God of Genesis, the kind of defense that 
Bloom argues is necessary for ephebes to overcome their great predecessors. 
The defensive tactic of the Gnostics most interesting to Bloom (and analogous to his 
theory) is textual, a fiercely ironic revisionism or antithetical troping that, according to 
Jonas, "tries, not to demonstrate agreement, but to shock by blatantly subverting the 
meaning of the most firmly established, and preferably also the most revered, elements of 
tradition" (92). Among the examples of this troping that Jonas points to is the Gnostic 
version of the story of Cain, which imagines that God disdained Cain's sacrifice for not 
being bloody enough, virtually driving him to slay his brother (93-96). Again, the parallel 
to Bloom should be clear; Bloom's Paradise Lost is completely antithetical to Milton's 
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poem. Indeed, Jonas' description of Gnostic revisions is practically identical with 
Bloom's own notion of misprision: 
Perhaps we should speak in such cases, not of allegory at all, but of a form of 
polemics, that is, not of an exegesis of the original text, but of its tendentious 
rewriting. Indeed, the Gnostics in such cases hardly claimed to bring out the 
correct meaning of the original, if by 'correct' it meant the meaning intended by 
its author—seeing that this author, directly or indirectly, was their great 
adversary, the benighted creator-god. Their unspoken claim was rather that the 
blind author had unwittingly embodied something of the truth in his partisan 
version of things, and that this truth can be brought out by turning the intended 
meaning upside down. (The Gnostic Religion 95) 
It was inevitable that Bloom would eventually turn to Kabbalah, which for him is not 
just a model for literary theory, but a very religion of irony. Bloom observes, "Genesis 
had said that God created the world out of nothing. Kabbalah took this over as a literal 
statement, but interpreted it revisionistically as meaning just the opposite of what it said" 
(Kabbalah and Criticism 25). According to Kabbalah, God is only conceived in 
language, which is expressed in the Sefirot. "The Sefirot are complex figurations for God, 
tropes or turns of language that substitute for God when he is at work in creation," Bloom 
explains (25), which is not to say that they are allegorical, but rather something else. The 
question of exactly what the Sefirot are, with relation to the "real" God, is an ongoing 
debate. Bloom notes that the Kabbalist Moses Cordovero believed them to be both His 
vessels and essence, which is somehow not to conceive of God and language, or the 
specific language of the Sefirot, as the same, yet "the conceptual difficulty remains [...] 
and has its exact analogues in certain current debates about the relationship between 
language and thought" (26-27).17 Again, Bloom finds parallels between 
mystical/religious and critical/artistic categories of experience. 
17
 Presumably Bloom means the debates surrounding Deconstruction and high semiotic theory. 
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For Bloom, the important insight of Kabbalah for literary influence is how the Sefirot 
and subsequent elaborations on them are processes or tropes that do not move in a single 
direction, and yet are ordered in some way such that they can be apprehended by 
language and thought, a notion that might bear some resonance with Emerson's argument 
that the seer/sayer's dream is always "clearest and most permanent in words." In any 
case, Kabbalah inherited this important conception of God and reality as a happening 
from Gnosticicm, and eschewed the focus on being from its other forerunner, 
Neoplatonism. It is in this way that Bloom's argument that poems create nothing, least of 
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all presence, is properly understood. Presence is always in motion, becoming. 
Accordingly, absence can become too. Bloom sees in sixteenth-century Kabbalist 
Isaac Luria's thought a great leap in an understanding of creation that is not teleological, 
but rather a "startlingly regressive process, one in which an abyss can separate any one 
stage from another, and in which catastrophe is always a central event. Reality [...] is 
always breaking apart, and mending, a rhythm continuously present in time even as it 
first punctuated eternity" (Kabbalah and Criticism 39). Set against Christian Gnosticism, 
which Bloom notes was anti-Jewish in its conception of a hostile and alien God, Luria's 
explanation of creation accounts for God's absence as a sort of necessity due to the very 
character of God, traits that bear striking resemblances to the revisionary tropes of poetic 
influence. Luria's creation myth explains a process by which God withdraws to make 
space for creation, and says the first word, a word that culminates in the creation of the 
universe and that is also a violent collision of lights, which results in something called the 
"breaking of the vessels." Like all mystical explanations, this is difficult to parse, but it 
18
 It would be proper, perhaps, to see the problems of presence and absence as the result of a (Neo)Platonic 
myth of eternal forms; Gnosticism, and especially Kabbalah, are not committed to metaphysics of "being"; 
presence and absence happen. 
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seems that the first word was too strong for language, and the breaking of the vessels is a 
metaphor of the simultaneity of coming-into-being and shattering; accordingly, the vision 
of capacity inherent in the vessel corresponds to the Emersonian transparent eyeball, and 
the shattering corresponds to a dream of space as in Neitzsche's boat, and we see that the 
"breaking of the vessels" is the simultaneity of both visions, anxieties, or tropes, a 
metaphor of presence and absence. 
But Bloom's attraction to the myth is that it goes on, and shattering turns to retraction 
and withdrawal. An aspect of Luria's creation story important to Bloom is this notion of 
withdrawal, God's withdrawal, which returns us to a central concern of Gnostic thought: 
God's absence. In the myth, much of the light returns to God, and some remains to create 
the evil in the world. Within the evil forces reside some part of the pattern or design of 
the universe; "sparks-of-light," called the pneuma, inhere. 
Bloom notes that Luria appears to have thought that the violence of creation, God's 
apparent absence, the existence of evil, and the descent of the pneuma into individual 
humans are all the result of a richly internal stress in God, an overabundance of the 
Sefirot trope of Din, or "rigorous judgment." According to Bloom, Luria "saw the whole 
function of creation as being God's catharsis [...] not unlike Freud's extraordinary 
explanation as to why people fall in love, which is to avoid an over-filled inner self' 
(Kabbalah and Criticism 41). What is striking here is how, in Kabbalah, all creation is 
the consequence of ratios of psychic material to psychic capacity. Whereas influence 
anxiety is the sense of another over-occupying one's psychic space, absence anxiety is 
the horrible echo of one's self in psychic space. The super-abundant Din in God is 
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analogous to the same self-crowding of psychic space that Freud says leads one to love 
another. Absence anxiety is the surfeit of love, too much self, or lonesomeness. 
Bloom's own position as a critical figure, as an "Emersonian Gnostic" (Blume par. 
15) is a lonely one. In part, the ambivalent reaction to his critical output within the 
academy (he is wildly successful outside of it) is analogous to the popularity of 
Deconstruction, Transcendentalism, Gnosticism, and Kabbalah; all of these movements 
withered into obscurity, and some of that was due to their strangeness, and what is 
strange about all of them is how each attends to the dynamic of presence and absence. 
Lentricchia and so many others correctly observe how Gnostic thought creates a 
"severance," but this reveals more about the kind of privilege given to presence in the 
Western tradition and thought than to a Gnostic (or Bloomian) obsession with absence. 
Gnosticism and influence anxiety imply presence and absence, not as fixed states of 
being, but as movement. Bloom writes: 
Whether one accepts a theory of language that teaches the dearth of meaning, as 
in Derrida and de Man, or that teaches its plenitude, as in Barfield and Ong, does 
not seem to me to matter [...]. Theory of poetry, as I pursue it, is reconcilable 
with either extreme view of poetic language, though not with any views in 
between. Either the new poet fights to win freedom from dearth, or from plenitude 
[...]. ("Breaking of Form" 5). 
Dearth of meaning is absence, its plenitude is presence, and the poet is in constant motion 
between these two poles. It should be clear that influence anxiety is all about reaction 
against overstrong presence, but Bloom argues against interpreting this as a theory of 
absence, or specifically the "negative thinking" as expressed by Herbert Marcuse: '"The 
absent must be made present because the greater part of the truth is in that which is 
absent'" (Kabbalah and Criticism 79). Bloom observes that the final phase of Luria's 
tripartite creation story, tikkun, or "representation" is that of redemptive restitution, a task 
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that falls to humanity. The vessels have been smashed, but the "lifting up and gathering 
in of sparks, the basic image of tikkun, can remind us that the Latin repraeseritare [...] 
meant to bring something absent into presence" (78). And to make presence is to trope 
against lonesomeness, to love. 
There is one thought left to think, and that is of Bloom's theory as his own elaborate 
defense or explanation of why he is not a poet. Belatedness, influence anxiety, a theory of 
poetic creation that has at its center Bloom's own great skill of reading; all of these 
constitute Bloom's defense against the fact that he is not a poet, specifically a Romantic 
poet. But the gift of Bloom's writing is how such an elaborate defense shelters us, the 
vast and forever belated, from all anxieties. If to make presence, to create art, is akin to 
loving, so too is reading, and readers can love—literally trope against absence, death, 
dearth of meaning—as fiercely as any poet. It is finally the case that every poem, which 
is to say, every agon or fight, is also a record of fantastic love. "[0]ne of the major 
reasons why we do read and should read is because we cannot possibly know enough 
people or know them closely enough," Bloom says, and this is a humanism of the highest 
order; it may not be the case that reading well makes us any better, but to read well is to 
represent {tikkun), to gather the sparks, find the Emersonian eternal divine, the pneuma, 
to achieve Gnosis. 
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